

UNITED NATIONS

United Nations Security Council, Verbatim Record of the Eight
Hundred and Fifty-Ninth Meeting, 25 May 1960, S/PV. 859,
page 26

Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon), President:

"This confirms the contention that there is universal recognition of the principle that airspace over the territory of any State is a sovereign right of that State, and that it cannot be invaded by any other State without its authority and permission. This is a right which is particularly important to small States and, as a small State which pays special attention to its obligations under the Charter and to international law and practice, Ceylon would like to stress this right very emphatically."

United Nations Security Council, Verbatim Record of the Eight
Hundred and Fifty-Ninth Meeting, 25 May 1960, S/PV. 859,
page 12-15

Mr. Correa (Ecuador):

"We understand the annoyance felt by the Soviet Union with regard to flights of foreign planes over Soviet territory. The same annoyance would be felt by any State if such flights occurred, no matter what the country might be from which the flights originated."

United Nations Security Council, Verbatim Record of the Eight
Hundred and Fifty-Eighth Meeting, 24 May 1960, S/PV. 858, page 3

Mr. Berard (France):

"In truth, the incident of 1 May and the overflights which the Government of the USSR is denouncing come under the category of intelligence activities. These activities,

beyond all question, are regrettable and it may be admitted that they imply interference in a country's internal affairs. My Government would wish that the States could abstain from such activities, but in the present world situation, with the opposition which places two groups of countries face to face, or, at the very least, considering the distrust with which they watch one another, these activities are, alas, a current practice."

United Nations Security Council, Verbatim Record of the Eight Hundred and Sixty-third Meeting, 27 May 1960, S/PV. 863, page 11

Mr. Slim (Tunisia):

"In the course of the debate on another question -- the subject of documents S/4314 and S/4315 -- during which we dealt with that specific problem, the delegation of Tunisia stated clearly and without any ambiguity at all that it could not countenance the violation of the air space of a sovereign State for any reason whatsoever, since that would be counter to the well-established principles of international law."

**Chronology of U-2 Missions
from September 6th to October 14th**

Mission 3090 was considered during the period 6-16 September. The weather was checked daily. The mission went to go-no-go on 16 September, but the weather turned bad and the mission was cancelled.

Mission 3091 was flown over Isle of Pines on 17 September; however, the mission was negated because of heavy cloud cover.

Mission 3092 could not be flown between 18 and 21 September because of bad weather and was cancelled.

Mission 3093 was under consideration from 22 September and was flown on 26 September. It covered Guantanamo and the Banes site. SAM sites were discovered at Chaparra, Jiguani, and Los Angeles.

CIA in its monthly forecast requested one mission for October and permission to carry over into October any of the flights approved for September which had not been flown. At the time the forecast was drafted four flights remained in the approved September program. Approved by Special Group on 27 September.

Mission 3094 was alerted on 27 September and cancelled on the 28th--bad weather.

Mission 3095 flown on 29 September. The SAM and the cruise missile sites at Siguanoa on the Isle of Pines were discovered.

Mission 3096 and 3097 were considered during the period 29 September through 2 October. Both were cancelled because of bad weather.

Mission 3098 was delayed because of weather on 3 October. It was alerted on 4 October and successfully flown on 5 October. The Manzanillo SA-2 site was discovered.

Mission 3099 was launched on 6 October but aborted due to mechanical difficulties.

Mission 3100 was successfully flown on 7 October (peripheral along the northeast coast). Four SAM sites discovered (Chambas, Esmeralda, Manati, and Senado).

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001700180075-5

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Gen. Carter*

Attached is Blank Knocks' memo to you on actions generated by DCI's cables.

It's good for review — but suggest you don't show it to DCI. Let what few facts there are come off the top of your head — if queried.

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 Date: 3-21-91 By: _____

12 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

SUBJECT : The DCI's Cables from _____

1. On 7 September the DCI cabled: "Question very much if C-package will be helpful Cuba and urge frequent repeat missions of recent reconnaissance operations which Gilpatric advises informative. Also I support use of RF-101's if necessary. My hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast U.S. and possibly Latin America and the Caribbean areas."

ILLEGIB

I can find nothing on the record indicating that specific actions were taken as a result of this portion of the DCI's cable. However, I know that you were in frequent telephone contact during this period with Lemnitzer and other Pentagon officials concerning the 101's and other reconnaissance questions. The DCI's "hunch" about missiles was not passed along. It probably should have been but it was merely a re-affirmation of a position the DCI had taken here in town on several occasions prior to his wedding.

For actions taken as a result of other questions raised by the DCI in his 7 September cable, see Action Memo A-43 attached to the 7 September cable.

2. On 10 September the DCI cabled from Nice: "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba as such extreme costly measures to accomplish security and secrecy not consistent with other policies such as refugees, legal travel, etc. Appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBM's to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from over-flights. Suggest BNE study motives behind these defensive measures which even seem to exceed those provided most satellites."

Action Memo A-44 of 10 September was sent to DD/I quoting this passage and asking the BNE to undertake the necessary analysis. BNE's

response was sent to the Director in an 11 September cable. The response said that BNE "still persuaded that costly crash operation to install SA-2's is reasonably explained by other than desire to hide later build-up and the Soviets likely to regard advantage of major offensive build-up not equal to dangers of U.S. intervention."

ILLEGIB

3. On 13 September DCI cabled [] his views of the importance of going ahead with securing release of Cuban prisoners. Included in this cable was the following: "Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment of defensive equipment and installations is merely a prelude to the location of an offensive weapons capability and once this is done, the implementation of our policy as reported in the press might be extremely difficult and involve unacceptable dangers."

25X1

There is no record to indicate that this passage was passed along. It was in this cable that the DCI asked for you to go to the White House that night to talk with him on the KY-9. I do not know whether you have any record of this conversation with the DCI that night.

4. On 16 September the DCI cabled his extensive comments on the Cuban situation again making the point that we must carefully study the prospect of MRBM's in Cuba. You directed that this cable be given to DD/I and you assigned action responsibility to the DD/I. The DD/I's response is contained in a cable to the DCI on 18 September. The response once again stated the judgment that introduction of MRBM's was unlikely because of the risk of U.S. intervention.

5. On 20 September, the day after USIB had approved NIE 85-3, the DCI cabled from Nice and suggested the most careful consideration to the conclusion that the introduction of offensive missiles was unlikely. This was contained in paragraph one of the DCI's cable and this paragraph was passed along to the DD/I. No change was made to the Estimate, however, since it had already been approved and released.

6. The only record of written action taken with respect to reconnaissance over Cuba that I can find is DDCI's Action Memo A-53 of 21 September. A copy of this Action Memo, which assigns Agency responsibility for reconnaissance operations to DD/R, is attached.

HK
Hank Knoche

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Gen. Carter*

*Attached is Blank Knoch's
memo to you on actions
generated by DCI's cables.*

*It's good for review—
but suggest you don't show
it to DCI. Let what few
facts there are come off the
top of your head—* (DATE)

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Next Review Date:

Auth.: HR 70-3

Date: 3-24-91

By:

Mr. McCone:

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~~TOP SECRET~~

31 October 1962

The attached SNIE 85-3-62 was approved by the USIB on 19 September.

Also attached in chronological order are cables between headquarters and [] dealing with the subject of a possible Soviet offensive capability in Cuba.

On 7 September you cabled your hunch that we faced prospect of SSMS in Cuba.

On 10 September you cabled your view that the defensive ~~measures~~ ^{missiles} were being taken for the purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability and suggested BNE study motives behind these defensive ~~measures~~.

On 11 September we cabled you BNE's preliminary statement that installation of SAMs is more reasonably explained by other than desire to hide later build-up.

On 13 September you cabled that you were still concerned that the defensive equipment was merely a prelude to the location of an offensive capability.

On 16 September you cabled that we must carefully study the prospect of secret placement of several Soviet MRBMs.

On 18 September we cabled you that the SNIE 85-3 would conclude that the introduction of MRBMs would be unlikely.

On 19 September we cabled you the conclusions of the SNIE as approved by USIB.

On 20 September you cabled suggesting most careful consideration to conclusion last sentence paragraph D and you suggested that the Soviets might take an unexpected risk in order to establish an important trading position.

Walter Elder

Attachments

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